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Abstract 
Complex emergencies involving refugees 
often involvedilemmas concerningsecurity 
issues. Questions concerning the neutral- 
ity and demilitarization of refugee camps, 
the protection of aid and humanitarian 
workers, and law enforcement within the 
camps themselves continually arise. 
These issues are exacerba ted when refugee 
flows occur in highly unstableareassome- 
times characterized as "failed states." 
While debate has been stimulated by reflec- 
tions on the Great Lakes crisis and has fos- 
tered creative thinking about security 
options, definitive plans for thesupport of 
humanitarian operations has not yet mate- 
rialized. The burden placed upon UNHCR 
tooperatein problematical situations leads 
inevitably to ad hoc policy arrangements, 
which need to be replaced with concrete 
operational contingency planning, possi- 
bly involving standby forces dedicated to 
the support of humanitarian operations. 
Les situations d'urgences complexes ou 
des re'fugie's son t concerne's, pre'sen ten t 
souven t des dilemmes sur des questions de 
se'curitl. Des probltmes surgissent 
continuellement, lie's ri la neutralite' et la 
dbnilitarisation des camps de re'fugib, la 
protection des travailleurs d'aide 
humanitaire, ainsi que le maintien de 
l'ordre ri l'in te'rieur-?nt%edescamps. Ces 
probl2mes se trouvent exacerbe's lorsque les 
flux de re'fugie's surviennent dans des 
re'gions ri hau te instabilite', qui sont m&me 
parfois appele'es u ttats en faillite B. Alors 
que le de'bat s'est trouve' stimuli par des 
re'flexions sur la crise des Grands Lacs 
et a encourage' la cre'ativite' dans la re- 
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cherche d'options possibles en matitre de 
se'curitl, desplans di!jinitifs sur la facon de 
soutenir les ope'rations humanitaires 
n'ont toujours pas vu le jour. Le fardeau 
impose'au HCR d'ope'rer dlins des situa- 
tions proble'matiques m2ne imman- 
quablement ri l'adoptiondesolutions et de 
politiques improvise'es. I1 importe de les 
remplacerpar des plans d'urgenceconcrets, 
comportant peut-Ztre des troupes en e'tat 
d'alerte et re'serve'es uniquement au 
sou tien des ope'ra tions hurnanitaires 
Introduction 
In recent years, refugee flows have 
reached staggering proportions. The 
United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 
22.7 million people in over 140 coun- 
tries fall under its concern.' In addi- 
tion, the kinds of conflicts that are 
producing refugees are different from 
those that fostered the original legal 
instruments governing the refugee 
regime. In contrast to the interna- 
tional conflicts of the first half of the 
Twentieth Century, the last fifty years 
have been witness primarily to internal 
conflicts -many of which have targeted 
civilian populations. The instability 
and violence that have accompanied 
these kinds of conflicts, in which par- 
ticular ethnic groups or minorities 
have often been especially at risk, have 
led to massive refugee flows across in- 
ternational borders. In addition, inter- 
nally displaced population~ have 
become an issue of great concern to 
UNHCR* 
When massive flows of refugees 
have crossed national boundaries, 
they have often entered regions that 
have few resources and weak govern- 
mental infrastructure. In some cases, 
host states themselves have been in a 
state of virtual collapse and the re- 
gions into which refugees have relo- 
cated have been in a state of chaos or 
even civil war. These kinds of situa- 
tions have posed enormous problems 
for UNHCR. Many questions have 
arisen: how to establish and protect 
access to refugees, how to protect 
humanitarian aid workers, how to 
maintain neutrality in situations in- 
volving conflict and how to prevent 
refugee camps from becoming bases 
for armed militant groups. Aspects of 
these issues are relevant in refugee 
situations in West Timor, Kosovo, 
Tanzania, Kenya, the South Kivu 
Province in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) and in the current 
controversy over humanitarian aid 
in Sudan. From these challenges has 
arisen genuine debate over the best 
way in which UNHCR can accom- 
plish its mandate given these highly 
volatile and unstable situations. One 
of the central questions being asked 
is, "What is the nexus between secu- 
rity and humanitarian aid to refu- 
gees?" Who is responsible for security 
arrangements and what has been the 
experience of UNHCR with regard to 
these issues? What are the possible 
policies regarding the physical se- 
curity of refugee populations? These 
issues have framed a serious debate 
over the role of UNHCR in the contem- 
porary world of internal and interna- 
tional conflicts. 
Refugees and the Failed State3 
Host states are generally considered to 
be responsible for the security of refu- 
gee populations. UNHCRgenerally is 
invited by the host government to ad- 
minister relief to these populations, 
and is present with the consent of a 
government. The Refugee Convention 
of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol require 
signatories to provide refugees with 
the same minimum standards given 
comparable populations within their 
borders. In theory, it is the responsibil- 
ity of the host state to provide for the 
physical security of refugees. 
In fact, however, refugee flows have 
often entered areas of minimal infra- 
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structure and control by a central au- 
thority. In 1994, more than 2 million 
refugees exited Rwandan. Large po- 
pulations entered Tanzania and the 
eastern provinces of the DRC, formerly 
Zaire. In the case of Zaire, the situa- 
tion was especially chaotic. Zaire's 
population of 40 million had been gov- 
erned since the 1960's by Mobuto Sese 
Seko, who had literally robbed the 
country of billions of dollars. Zaire 
was in economic shambles: 85% of its 
roads at independence had, by 1994, 
disintegrated into bush. AIDS was 
rampant, and governmental adminis- 
tration was nonexistent or corrupt4 
Zaire was an example of "the new Afri- 
can spectre of stateless countries," 
which was also seen in Somalia, 
Liberia and Sierra L e ~ n e . ~  
This phenomenon of the "failed 
state" poses substantial challenges for 
institutions seeking to provide hu- 
manitarian relief. Failed states are 
"invariably the product of a collapse 
of the power structures providing po- 
litical support for law and order, a 
process generally triggered and ac- 
companied by 'anarchic' forms of 
internal~iolence."~ Former Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, described the situation 
as follows: 
A feature of such conflicts is the col- 
lapse of state institutions, especially 
the police and judiciary, with result- 
ing paralysis of governance, a break- 
down of law and order and general 
banditry and chaos. Not only are the 
functions of government sus- 
pended, but its assets are destroyed 
or looted and experienced officials 
are killed or flee the country. This is 
rarely the case in inter-state wars.' 
The basic instruments of interna- 
tional law regarding refugees, the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967Protoco1, uti- 
lize a definition of refugee that has in 
fact been broadened in practice; Origi- 
nally written in response to the mas- 
sive relocations after World War 11, 
the 1951 Convention defines a refugee 
as any person who 
owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, reli- 
gion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwillingto avail himself 
of the protektion of that country or to 
return to it.8 
The 1967 Protocol removed the date 
and geographical limitations of the 
original convention, making it a truly 
universal instrument. To date there are 
more than 137 states party to one or 
both of these legal instruments. 
The original definition of refugee 
has in fact been broadened however, . 
The Organization of African Unity Con- 
vention (OAU) Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
adopted in 1969, is the most important 
of several regional instruments. It ex- 
pands the definition of refugee to in- 
clude 
every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously dis- 
turbing public order in either part or 
the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his 
place of habitual residence in order to 
seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nati~nality.~ 
The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention 
talked about refugees in terms of indi- 
vidual persecution. The OAU Con- 
vention greatly broadened the 
definition of refugee, to include 
those people fleeing external aggres- 
sion, occupation, foreign domination, 
or serious public disorder. Refugee 
status under the OAU Convention 
could be granted to groups as well as 
individuals. In addition, this conven- 
tion was the first legal document to in- 
clude the principle of voluntary 
repatriation. The OAU convention 
was designed in the post-decolon- 
izationera, whenmany important Afri- 
can leaders aspired to Pan-Africanism. 
African states were encouraged to 
open their borders to their brothers and 
sisters from other parts of the conti- 
nent; and indeed, many states were 
then and some still are, welcoming 
refugees. 
In the early 1970 '~~ optimism pre- 
vailed. Most African leaders viewed 
refugee problems as transitory. Refu- 
gees themselves numbered about one 
million and there was significant re- 
gional cooperation in dealing with 
refugees. However the sheer num- 
bers of refugees, 7.2 million in 1999, 
combined with the lack of economic 
development in many African states 
and the increasing numbers of internal 
crises and conflicts, have caused a 
significant change in the willingness 
and capacities of many African states 
to host massive numbers of refugees. 
The emphasis turned to voluntary re- 
patriation in the 1980s, and this has 
been the primary objective of most refu- 
gee projects. 
The problem is no longer consid- 
ered transitory but virtually intrac- 
table. And every aspect of the 
'African refugee crisis' has changed 
dramatically. The main source of 
refugees is no longer wars of inde- 
pendence, but more often brutal 
civil and guerilla conflicts. Humani- 
tarian refugee situations have be- 
come politicized and militarized 
beyond recognition. Refugees are 
rarely welcomed as guests these 
days and states are increasingly fol- 
lowing the lead of the regions of the 
world in closing their doors.1° 
The 1950 Statute of UNHCR speci- 
fies the mandate of UNHCR, which is 
the protection and assistance of refu- 
gees. Its functions include providing 
international protection and seeking 
permanent solutions for the prob- 
lems of refugees. According to Chap- 
ter I, General Provisions of the 
Statute, "The work of the High Com- 
missioner shall be of an entirely non- 
political character; it shall be 
humanitarian and social.. ."I1 The 
High Commissioner is charged with 
providing for the protection of refugees 
by "(p)romoting through special 
agreements with Governments the 
execution of any measure calcu- 
lated to improve the situation of 
refugees and to reduce the number 
requiring protecti~n."'~ 
The Case of Eastern Zaire 
The politicization and militarization 
of refugees was first seen on a large 
scale in the Horn of Africa in the 
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early 1990s, when Ethiopian refugees 
participated in large scale assaults 
on humanitarian relief supplies and 
on the Somali population. The crisis 
in Eastern Zaire, however, following 
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, 
brought these problems into high re- 
lief. The Great Lakes crisis was truly 
a watershed in refugee issues and has 
led to serious assessments of refugee 
policies.13 
Among the most serious dilemmas 
facing the aid agencies was the 
question of separating militarized 
elements from true refugee po- 
pulations. In 1994, for example, the 
dilemma reached a peak with the ac- 
knowledgement that armed elements 
were not only prevalent within the 
camps, but in some cases actually 
controlled them. Nevertheless, 
UNHCR continued to try to feed the 
refugee populations and tried to help 
the innocent. The High Commis- 
sioner, Sadako Ogata has stressed the 
difference between humanitarian aid 
and military or policing activities, 
which, she has said, is the purview of 
the Security Council of the United Na- 
tions.14 Others have suggested that 
in a complex crisis such as that of 
the Great Lakes, in which armed ele- 
ments and guerrilla fighters are 
harbored in camps, once an immediate 
crisis is addressed, the aid agency 
should simply pull out. These critics 
have argued that if the local host 
government is unable or willing to 
provide necessary security arrange- 
ments and if the Security Council or 
a regional institution is also unable 
or unwilling to ensure the security of 
large refugee populations, humani- 
tarian agencies should not be put in 
the position of operating in an inse- 
cure environment or trying to accom- 
plish objectives which are not part of 
their mandates. Another significant 
change apparent during and after the 
Great Lakes Crisis was the new danger 
to aid workers. A total of 36 UNHCR 
staff and workers were killed or lost 
during the crisis.15 
It was very clear in Eastern Zaire 
that the camps were occupied by both 
innocent civilians and armed ele- 
ments from the former Rwandan army 
and the Interahamwe. These armed el- 
ements intimidated the refugee 
populations. Many of the refugees 
themselves had been forced to leave 
Rwanda and sometimes even killed 
when they wanted to return. If these 
factions did not live within the 
camps, they lived immediately out- 
side of them. President Nyerere of 
Tanzania commented on this situa- 
tion: 
I was involved in the diplomatic work 
to get the international community 
to take the necessary action to sepa- 
rate the armed groups from the 
genuine refugees. The international 
community failed in that. They 
talked, talked, and talked. And even- 
tually Rwanda decided to do a bit of 
self help (in helping destroy the 
camps). And today whenwearetalk- 
ing of foreign armies in Congo, peo- 
ple forget about that of the other 
army - the Interahamwe - which is 
still there.16 
A debate raged concerning the prob- 
lem of functioning in this atmosphere 
of the militarization and politicization 
of refugee camps. In an Op Ed piece, 
Alain Destexhe, then Secretary-General 
of M6decins Sans FrontiBres, an- 
nounced that his organization would 
withdraw from Rwandan refugee 
camps in Zaire and Tanzania, because 
aid to refugees was, in effect, support- 
ing killers.17 He maintained that the 
only hope of breaking the grip of the 
armed elements would be an interna- 
tional force to police the camps, re- 
quested by many aid agencies. 
However, a UN official announced 
that a plan to send an international 
force to restore order to Rwandan 
refugee camps in Eastern Zaire was to 
be shelved for lack of funds and 
troops.18 Destexhe noted that "(t)he 
camps have turned into prisons. Inter- 
national aid is the key to their (armed 
elements) efforts to resume the war. 
Food represents p~wer." '~ A UNHCR 
spokesman responded that the situa- 
tion was indeed perilous, but that 
UNHCR could not abandon the inno- 
cent.20 
The problems of "safe havens," also 
arose in reference to the post- 
Rwandan genocide refugee crisis. 
OperationTurquoise, a "safe humani- 
tarian zone" created by the French in 
southwest Rwanda, for Hutus fleeing 
from the advancing Rwandan Patriotic 
Front, has generated much interna- 
tional criticism. This unilateral French 
initiative, endorsed by the Security 
Council, appeared to provide protec- 
tion to those who had instigated the 
genocide. "Armed extremist Hutu mili- 
tia members operated openly in the 
zone, continuing to kill Tutsis living 
there and intimidating those Hutus 
living in camps who wanted to go 
home." 21 In the end, after France had 
turned over the operation to 
UNAMIR, violent confrontations be- 
tween RPA troops and Hutu extrem- 
ists took place in which perhaps 
thousands were killed. 
One of the operating principles of 
the agreements between governments 
and UNHCR is that camps be located 
away from sensitive borders and that 
they remain civilian, humanitarian, 
and neutral. The OAU Refugee Con- 
vention also stipulates these provi- 
sions. Clearly, the failure of the 
governments of Zaire and to a lesser 
extent Tanzania to comply with 
these provisions, exacerbated the cri- 
sis. UNHCR has maintained that the 
need to move the camps, which was 
essentially a treaty obligation in 
Zaire and Tanzania, was ignored. 
Because the camps were not moved, it 
became almost impossible to separate 
civilian refugees from agents of geno- 
cide. At first, militia wore uniforms 
and brandished arms openly. Later, 
one aid worker notes, uniforms were 
taken off and arms were hidden, when 
it became apparent that it was neces- 
sary to do that to obtain food and 
other supplies. Infact,this expertnotes 
that it would have been extremely 
difficultto distinguish between inno- 
cent civilians, the FAR and the ex- 
tremists. "It was impossible to 
separate them - they were husbands, 
sons, and even daughters."" 
One expert has commented that "in 
such a massive and difficult crisis, the 
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basic protection concerns are an early 
review of the refugees1 profile; the 
separating out of fighters and killers; 
and the location of camps away from 
sensitive border^."^^ He notes the criti- 
cal nature of support from key re- 
gionaland international governments, 
which in the case of Zaire, was not 
forthcoming. 
After other aid agencies threatened 
to pull out of the region, an ad hoc ar- 
rangement was developed. An elite 
Zairian force, Contingent Zafrois pour 
la Sicuriti duns les Camps, under the 
auspices of the UN, began what were 
essentially peacekeeping operations 
in refugee camps where former mili- 
tias had been perpetrating violence 
and intimidation. A multinational 
team oversaw this contingent. 
At the time, apparently, many other 
options were considered, including the 
use of contracted security forces, or se- 
curity firms. Contracted "mercenar- 
ies," or "security for hire," have been 
used in some instances in Africa. The 
Sierra Leone Secretary of Mines alleg- 
edly employed mercenaries at one time 
-many of them drawn from the former 
South African army." However, the use 
of contracted private security guards 
was seen to have substantial draw- 
backs, not the least of which was pro- 
hibitive 
This ad hoc arrangement utilizing 
the Zairian contingent was the first in 
the history of UNI-ICR, in which a na- 
tion's troops were used as peace- 
keepers on their own soil. Their orders 
were not to separate armed elements 
from civilians or perform disarma- 
ment itself, but rather only to maintain 
order in aid distribution. The UN 
would spend $1.3 million to pay for 
their clothes and e q ~ i p m e n t . ~ ~  
UNHCR also paid the salaries of 
the Zairians during the crisis. The 
contingent itself was drawn from 
Mobutu's PresidentialGuard, and was 
considered an "elite force," that was 
more a "gendarmerie" than a military 
unit. However, when the camps were 
attacked by Tutsi rebels in 1996, most 
of the Zairian contingent fled. Some 
Zairians were implicated in improper 
conduct (some apparently went away 
with vehicles, etc.), but some tried to 
"stick it 
At the end of 1995, the situation in 
Eastern Zaire was growing even more 
precarious. Tutsis, who had lived in 
the region for 200 years, were often 
considered foreigners and were har- 
assed by provincial Zairian authorities. 
Hutu refugees in the area were accused 
of encouraging Zairian Hutu to attack 
their neighbours. 
A large population of predomi- 
nantly Hutu refugees from Burundi 
was also present in eastern Zaire. In 
late 1996 many were forced back to 
Burundi by Tutsi-led Zairian armed 
groups and handed over to Burundi 
government forces at the border. Hun- 
dreds of adult men are believed to have 
been executed by the Burundi security 
forces near the border or in the capital, 
Bujumbura. 28 
In late 1995, Tutsi rebels began to 
challenge the Zairian army; and the 
Zairian government accused the 
Rwandan government of supporting 
the insurgency. Meanwhile, incur- 
sions by former FAR elements across 
the border into Rwanda were occur- 
ring with greater frequency. In No- 
vember, 1996, Goma in Zaire fell to the 
rebels, undoubtedly supported by the 
Rwandan army. The UN evacuated its 
relief workers and thousands of refu- 
gees scattered, many into the interior 
forests of Zaire.29 The rebel insur- 
gents, with the aid of the Rwandan 
army, eventually made their way to 
Kinshasa, where they met little resist- 
ance in assuming control of the gov- 
ernment, deposing Mobuto Sese Seko, 
who died shortly thereafter in a 
neighbouringstate, fromprostate can- 
cer. 
During this time period, the interna- 
tional community, responding to the 
chaos in the region and hearing re- 
ports that hundreds of thousands of 
refugees were at serious risk, began to 
consider military intervention. 
Canada volunteered to lead an inter- 
national force into Eastern Zaire. The 
plan for between 10,000 and 15,000 
ground troops from approximately a 
dozen nations was reluctantly en- 
dorsed by other members of the Secu- 
rity Council, including the US, which 
sent a team of 40 military observers to 
assess the situation. The mission of 
the force would have been to secure the 
airfield at Goma and establish a 3 
mile-wide corridor from Goma to 
Rwanda. This would have been a 
combination of an effort to secure ac- 
cess for humanitarian airlift of sup- 
plies and also to encourage Rwandan 
repatriati~n.~" 
When the Tutsis routed the camps in 
November 1996, however, huge num- 
bers of refugees began an unprec- 
edented massive return to Rwanda. 
When governments and aid groups 
met in Stuttgart, enthusiasm for the 
military option had declined. 
Laurent Kabila, who had been in- 
stalled as President of the DRC, pro- 
claimed that "no foreign force" would 
be permitted on DRC's territory.31 By 
December, 1996, the idea of a UN emer- 
gency operation had essentially been 
ruled out. 
The Great Lakes crisis, as it came 
to be called, focused international at- 
tention on the dilemmas faced by 
UNHCR in coping with massive in- 
fluxes of refugees into highly unstable 
areas or into states with little or no 
administrative capacities. Zaire had 
little infrastructure or capacity to pro- 
vide security for the camps. The mas- 
sive refugee flow upset an already 
precarious ethnic balance and re- 
quired resources which the region sim- 
ply did not have. Ad hoe arrangements 
became necessary as UNHCR negoti- 
ated with local authorities. Eventually, 
under pressure frommany aid groups, 
the Zairian contingent was underwrit- 
ten by the UN. Neither the regional or- 
ganizations nor the international 
community as a whole was willing to 
provide the resources and troops that 
would have been necessary to secure the 
camps and ensure the delivery of sup- 
plies. The consequences of this in- 
ability to provide security are 
well-known. The ramifications of the 
post-1994 crisis have been grave - a 
state in further collapse in which 22 
different entities are participating in 
what has come to be called Africa's 
First World War, the loss of thousands 
- - -  - - - - -- 
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of lives of refugees in the jungles of 
Central Zaire and a refugee crisis that 
has spread from the borders of 
Rwanda all the way into Congo 
Brazzaville. 
A Contrasting Case: Security and 
Refugees in Northern Iraq3' 
In 1991, following the conclusion of 
the Gulf War, a crisis involving the 
Kurds located in the northern area of 
Iraq began to unfold. Encouraged by 
remarks by President Bush and possi- 
bly believing that Iraqi forces had been 
substantially undermined during the 
war, various Kurdish elements in this 
area mounted a revolt. Republican 
guards, however, quickly entered the 
area, driving thousands of Kurds into 
the harsh mountains of Northern Iraq 
and Southern Turkey. Turkey, unwill- 
ing to receive massive influxes of 
Kurds, reinforced its borders, even, in 
some instances, firing on Kurdish ci- 
vilians. In spite of reports that t he~e  
were more than 450,000 refugees in the 
mountains, and that the death rate was 
more than 2000 refugees per day, the 
international community seemed at 
first to be immobilized. The United 
States found itself in a diplomatic quan- 
dary -its NATO ally, Turkey, refused to 
receive the refugees. Yet clearly, the 
situation, from a humanitarian per- 
spective, was becoming critical. 
Secretary of State, James Baker, sur- 
veyed the situation from the air and 
reported to President Bush on the se- 
verity of the problem. At the time, the 
borders between Turkey and Iraq were 
porous and ill defined, and the U.S. 
military was not allowed on the 
ground in the area. Nevertheless, 
flights into the area were conducted 
fairly frequently. The U.S. military be- 
gan to plan contingency operations 
for a humanitarian operation, should 
the President order one. In factlone Sun- 
day, President Bush announced that 
the U.S. would begin an airdrop of sup- 
plies. In the meantime, Mme. Mitterand, 
wife of France's President Mitterand, 
had designed a "way point" policy, in 
which the military would secure way 
points on mountain passes to facilitate 
repatriation of the refugees. With this 
plan as a starting point, a coalition of 
NATO nations met in Ankara to discuss 
the difficulties of securing supplies for 
and repatriation of the Kurdish refu- 
gees. Having seen firsthand the extreme 
difficulty in airdropping of supplies 
into the area (weather conditions were 
dangerous and supplies often did not 
reach those for whom they were in- 
tended), Operation Provide Comfort 
was born. A "security zone" was cre- 
ated to bring the refugees out of the 
mountains, utilizing way points set up 
by the French. Turkey's permission was 
secured for the staging of the operation. 
A map was drawn following a natural 
ridgeline, and an area designated for 
humanitarian operations. 
The Iraqi army was present in very 
small numbers in this area at that time. 
However, it was decided that Iraqi 
tanks and heavy artillery would not be 
permitted to enter. An army colonel 
was sent in a jeep with a white flag to 
speak with the Iraqi general in that 
area. The general was told that the coa- 
lition forces were coming across into 
this zone, not to occupy it, but to facili- 
tate the return of the Kurds and to sup- 
ply them with relief aid. The Iraqi 
general reported that the would relay 
the message. Subsequent to that, there 
was a tacit understanding that 'Op- 
eration Provide Comfort would pro- 
ceed. The Iraqi military in the zone 
were not disarmed or harmed. 
UN officials, including Mrs. Ogata, 
were briefed in Paris prior to the intro- 
duction of military force into the area. 
UNHCR had representation in the 
zone, and the operation was endorsed 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
and Security Council Resolution 688. 
It called the suppression of the Kurds 
a threat to "international peace and se- 
curity in the region," required Iraq to 
allow humanitarian relief into that 
area and demanded that Iraq cooper- 
ate with the Secretary-General to real- 
ize these goals.33 
As a result, aircraft of Turkey, 
France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States began air operations 
from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to 
enforce a "no-fly" zone. This zone was 
originally designed to ensure that re- 
lief could be provided to Kurds on the 
ground and that forces enforcing dis- 
tribution of aid and securing return of 
the refugees would be protected. The 
demarcation line was the 36fh parallel, 
which to date still delineates theNorth- 
em No-Fly Zone in Iraq, which was not 
discontinued after the refugee crisis 
was over. 
In contrast to the situation in East- 
ern Zaire, one finds in an analysis of 
the Kurdish refugee crisis a strong 
determination on the part of the NATO 
coalition, led by the United States, to 
provide security for a humanitarian 
operation. Because of perceived strate- 
gic interests in that area, not the least of 
which was a desire to prevent the 
destabilization of Turkey through a 
massive influx of Kurds and fueled by 
the "CNN effect," which high- 
lighted the impending humanitarian 
disaster, the international community 
took a decisive action. This action was 
buttressed by legal arguments con- 
tained in the Security Council Resolu- 
tions. In many respects, this instance 
foreshadowed operations in Kosovo, in 
which there were strong and close ties 
between humanitarian and military 
operations. Mrs. Ogatanoted these ties 
and also the relationship between po- 
litical solutions and humanitarian ac- 
tion when she commented that "(t)he 
Gulf crisis was a major turning point 
for humanitarian and refugee work. 
It gave a new dimension not only to 
material assistance to victims of con- 
flict and mass displacement, but also to 
the manner in which political action 
and humanitarian aid interact with 
each other."34 
Recent Security Provisions in 
Refugee Operations: West 
Timor, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Sudan, and Thailand 
Issues concerning refugee safety, neu- 
trality and location of camps and ad- 
ministration of aid in hostile 
environments continually arise. In 
Thailand, for example, the Bangkok 
government has asked UNI-ICR to ex- 
pand its assistance to approximately 
100,000 refugees from Myanmar who 
live in camps along a common border. 
Some of the refugees have been subject to 
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armed attack and UNHCR has been 
asked to help move refugees away from 
sensitive border areas.35 
In fact, Thailand represents one of 
the earliest examples of cooperation 
between national military forces and 
humanitarian refugee efforts. In the 
1980s, Vietnamese refugees, seeking 
to reach Thailand by boat, were often 
subjected to "pirates" in the South 
China Sea. The Thai Coast Guard, 
funded by UNHCR, mounted an anti- 
piracy project to apprehend thehijack- 
ers. A liaison unit, equipped by 
UNHCR and made up of Thais, pa- 
trolled an area of the sea, providing 
some access for victims. In some in- 
stances, there were attempts to pros- 
ecute some of the pirates. 
Currently, an interesting and inno- 
vative arrangement is taking place in 
Tanzania, in which UNHCR is provid- 
ing material support to Tanzanian po- 
lice units to help maintain law 
enforcement and security of camps.36 
Incentives in the nature of financial 
backing of salaries, training and equip- 
ment to the police are provided. The 
refugees consist primarily of 
Burundians, fleeing the civil war in 
the DRC and Rwandans. The total 
refugee population is more than 
800,000. Tanzania, which had always 
been a model of the "welcoming state" 
for African refugees, had recently 
changed its open door policy. 
In 1995, Tanzania closed its border 
to approximately 50,000 Rwandan 
and Burundian refugees. With the ad- 
vent of a multi-party system, the end of 
Ujamaa, and a more open press, land 
became more highly prized and op- 
position to the "open door" policy 
more pronounced. The presence of 
armed elements in the refugee popu- 
lation from Rwanda in 1994 and the 
fears that the situation in Tanzania 
might degenerate to resemble that in 
Eastern Zaire, caused this major shift 
in Tanzanian policy. According to 
Tanzania's Deputy Home Affairs Min- 
ister, "Protecting and assisting refu- 
gees has brought new risks to 
national security, exacerbated ten- 
sions between states and caused 
extensive damage to the environ- 
ment."37 In light of the overwhelm- 
ing burden of refugee influxes on 
states that have limited resources, the 
new program to support dedicated 
Tanzanian police units in their efforts 
to provide security to refugee camp 
operations has been a welcome inno- 
vation, that is generally acknowl- 
edged as successful. 
Some support has also been 
given from UNHCR to Kenya. 
UNHCR has experienced severe 
problems in the Dadaab camp, which 
borders Ethiopia and is not far from 
Uganda. There, banditry and unlaw- 
fulness have been rampant. Interclan 
rivalries have fuelled violence in the 
camps and among the refugee popula- 
tion, which is largely Somalian. 
Women have been the principal vic- 
tims and UNHCR reported a disturb- 
ingly high incidence of rape, some 
perpetrated by fellow refugees.38 Be- 
cause the local enforcement capacity 
of the Kenyangovernment was judged 
tobe very weak, support was given to 
reinforce the police. In addition, there 
hasbeen an attempt to provide support 
for the prosecution of rape cases in lo- 
calcourt~.~~ According to one UNHCR 
expert, refugee communities are often 
very large and involve typical law 
and order issues common to any 
large community -theft, rape, intirni- 
dation, and disorderly conduct. In 
many cases, the local judicial or law 
enforcement infrastructure is un- 
able to cope with the new security 
problems generated within the camps. 
For example, jail space may be very 
limited, or the judicial structure weak 
or non-e~istent.~" 
Recent incidents in the civil war in 
Sudan have further highlighted the 
dilemmas facing humanitarian aid 
agencies concerning neutrality. In 
February 2000, the SPLA army, fight- 
ing for autonomy for the southern 
half of Sudan, demanded that relief 
agencies sign a "Memorandum of Un- 
derstanding (MOU)" which would 
have the effect of recognizing the 
SPLA's jurisdiction over aid opera- 
tions, including vehicles, evacuation 
and local hiring. At first, international 
aid agencies uniformly condemned 
this memorandum, which would have 
effectively denied the agencies the 
neutrality which they have long con- 
sidered essential to their work. How- 
ever, as the March l deadline 
approached, many groups decided to 
sign the MOU, fearing that if they 
withdrew from the area, the vulner- 
able population would suffer. The EU's 
humanitarian office has taken a hard 
line against the memorandum and has 
criticized those agencies and NGOs 
that have acceded to it. The US govern- 
ment, in contrast, has decided to sup- 
port the individual choices of NGOs. 
This example is representative of the 
kinds of issues concerning neutrality 
facing the humanitarian relief organi- 
zations. 
In October 1999, Mrs. Ogata com- 
mented on the problems of the dis- 
placed in East and West Timor. "Since 
the arrival of the InterFET multina- 
tional force, UNHCR has worked in 
East Timor as part of an inter-agency 
team in bringing protection and assist- 
ance to displaced people.. .A UNHCR 
emergency team is now in Kupang, but 
access to refugees continues to be dif- 
ficult and sporadic.. .it is the protection 
and security situation that is of more 
serious concern. There are many re- 
ports of people having been forced by 
militias to leave East Timor. There are 
reports of people who may be forcibly 
kept, hostage-like, in West Timor." 
Mrs. Ogata continued by stressing that 
"the Indonesian government must pro- 
vide allnecessary security measure to 
secure both refugees and humanitar- 
ian agencies, maintain the civilian 
character of refugee sites and facilitate 
humanitarian activitiesU4l 
Debates Over Policy Alternatives 
Questions concerning security provi- 
sions involving refugees and humani- 
tarian relief workers have become 
critical issues for debate. In 1998, Secre- 
tary-General Kofi Annan was directed 
by the Security Council to report on 
African conflict and the promotion of 
peace in the continent. Sections 53-55 
of his report spoke directly to these is- 
sues. "The potential threat to African 
States posed by the movement of large 
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numbers of refugees when they are min- 
gled with combatants must be ac- 
knowledged. In the area of the Great 
Lakes, the movement of large numbers 
of Rwandan refugees into neighboring 
countries became a destabilizing factor 
for those countries, as well as for the 
new Government in R ~ a n d a . " ~ ~  
He recommended that refugee 
camps and settlements be kept free of 
any military presence or equipment, 
including arms and ammunition; that 
the neutrality and humanitarian 
character of the camps and settle- 
ments be scrupulously maintained; 
and that refugees be settled at a rea- 
sonable distance from any border, in 
camps of limited size. He noted that 
"some of the requirements relating to 
the protection of refugees and the sup- 
port of States hosting large refugee 
populations are beyond the capacity 
of humanitarian providers. Many re- 
late to matters of international peace 
and security for which the Security 
Council has primary responsibil- 
 it^."^^ In an important policy recom- 
mendation, the report concludes: 
I therefore urge the establishment of 
an international mechanism to assist 
host government in maintaining the 
security and neutrality of refugee 
camps and settlements. Such a 
mechanism might encompass train- 
ing, logistics, financial support, the 
provision of security personnel and 
the monitoring of national security 
arrangements. 44 
He notes later in the report that hu- 
manitarian assistance often raises 
difficult challenges. "Humanitarian 
assistance cannot stop a conflict and 
the diversion or abuse of humanitar- 
ian assistance may well prolong it."" 
Mrs. Ogata, in responding to the Sec- 
retary-General's Report on Africa, 
noted also that the "mixed nature of 
groups hosted in refugee camps - refu- 
gees coexisting with fighters, crimi- 
nals and agents of genocide, has been 
the greatest challenge to the work of 
my Office throughout the Great Lakes 
She comments that maintain- 
ing the civilian character of refugee 
camps is the responsibility of host 
governments. However, she notes 
that "different situations may require 
a variety of responses." She recom- 
mends a "ladder of options," in which 
the deployment of international police 
of military forces would be the "last re- 
sort." 
In situations in which it may be diffi- 
cult for host governments to imple- 
ment the required principles, 
international assistance is needed in 
building their capacity to enforce law, 
for example through the provision of 
equipment and other logistical sup- 
port for police forces.. .There are situ- 
ations, however, in whichbuilding or 
supporting local capacity are inad- 
equate to maintain the civilian char- 
acter of camps. Separation of 
refugees from criminals can then 
become an important security re- 
quirement and there may be no other 
option but to deploy international 
police or military forces.. .I hope that 
the Security Council will give con- 
crete follow-up to this recommenda- 
tion and will examine the possibility 
- for example - to create a stand-by 
international force in support of hu- 
manitarian operations." 
Debate culminating in Security 
Council Resolution 1208 followed 
these reports and comments inNovem- 
ber 1998. The Resolution states that 
having considered the Secretary-Gener- 
al's report and after affirming the pri- 
mary responsibility of States hosting 
refugees to ensure the security, civil- 
ian and humanitarian character of 
refugee camps and settlements, a 
range of measures by the international 
community is needed to share the bur- 
den borne by African States hosting 
refugees and to support their efforts in- 
cluding in the areas of law enforcement, 
disarmament of armed elements, cur- 
tailment of the flow of arms in refugee 
camps and settlements, separation of 
refugees from other persons who do not 
qualify for international protection af- 
forded to refugees.. .and demobiliza- 
tion and reintegration of former 
combatants. These measures could in- 
clude "training, logistical and techni- 
cal advice and assistance, financial 
support, the enhancement of national 
law enforcement mechanisms, the pro- 
vision or supervision of security 
guards and the deploymentinaccord- 
ance with the Charter of the United 
Nations of international police and 
military forces."48 
Progress in addressing these issues 
was further aided through the delibera- 
tions of the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme in 
January 1998. This report, "The Secu- 
rity of Civilian and Humanitarianchar- 
acter of Refugee Camps and 
Settlements," noted not only the prob- 
lems mentioned above, but also that "in- 
security can also arise as a result of 
several other factors, such as conflict 
amongst different groups within the 
refugee population, conflict between 
refugees and the local population, com- 
mon crime and banditry and in certain 
cases, the deployment of undisciplined 
police and security forces. In many in- 
stances, camps are located too close to 
international borders."49 
The report lists soft, medium, and 
hard options, which reflect the meas- 
ures that can be taken to ensure the se- 
curity and neutrality of camps. The 
following are some of the principal 
options suggested:50 
Soft Options: Preventive 
Measures and Cooperation with 
National Law Enforcement 
Authorities 
1) Location of camps: At a reasonable 
distance from borders; 
2) Size of Camps: Not to exceed 
20,000, as recommended in UNHCR's 
Emergency Handbook; 
3) Election of refugee representatives 
committed to camp neutrality; 
4) Distribution of aid directly to indi- 
viduals and families and not through 
leaders; 
5) Permanent presence of interna- 
tional humanitarian staff in or near 
camps; 
6) Assistance to host countries to 
carry out refugee status determination; 
7) A strategy of cooperation withna- 
tional law enforcement authorities 
when resources of host states are over- 
whelmed by security problems; 
8) Developing targeted training for 
the cooperating national forces, with a 
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monitoring role over basic policing 
standards. 
Medium Options: Deployment of 
Civilian or Police Monitors 
1) Utilization of private security 
firms, direct hiring of security person- 
nel and the deployment of civilian or 
police monitors (Report notes reserva- 
tions about this option); 
2) Deployment of multi-national ci- 
vilian observers to conduct monitoring 
missions, which would report through 
Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the presence of armed ele- 
ments in refugee camps; 
3) Deployment of an international 
police force by the United Nations or by 
regional organizations, which could be 
authorized and mandated by the Secu- 
rity Council and comprised of police 
units contributed by Member States. 
Hard Options: Military 
Deployment 
Deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Op- 
eration or that of a multinational or 
regional force under Chapter VI or 
Chapter VII. This would require the 
development of Stand-by arrange- 
ments of military and police units 
and personnel trained for humani- 
tarian operations. 
These options were expanded upon 
in the report of the Executive Commit- 
tee of 14 September 1999, "Strengthen- 
ing Partnership to Ensure Protection 
also in Relation to Se~ur i ty ."~~ In refer- 
ence to partnership between states, UN 
agencies and other actors, the report 
notes that "one such approach (similar 
to the current Danish Refugee Coun- 
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cil/Norwegian Refugee Council stand- 
by arrangement), foresees the identifi- 
cation of national police and/or 
military entities which may be rapidly 
deployed to provide security in camps 
on an emergency basis."52 
In the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Swedish police officers 
were partners with local police to pro- 
vide security in camps. Another option 
would be the use of stand-by arrange- 
ments such as those of the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations. Yet an- 
other might be a CIVPOL model used in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. 53 
The refugee operations of UNHCR 
in Kosovo required close cooperation 
with the military. The relationship be- 
tween NATO forces and UNHCR was 
one of the subjects examined by the 
UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analy- 
sis, "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An In- 
dependent Evaluation of UNHCR's 
Emergency Preparedness and Re- 
~ p o n s e . " ~ ~  Security problems during 
this crisis prompted some criticism of 
UNHCR. For example, a British Parlia- 
mentary report criticized UNHCR's role 
on security declaring that "it is not for 
NATO to be involved in such work, but 
rather UNHCR." UNHCR responded 
that "for UNHCR, a central lesson of 
the Great Lakes experience, as of expe- 
rience of the problem in other situa- 
tions of unresolved conflict, is that the 
humanitarian organizations alone 
cannot, and should not, be expected to 
address these ssues. UNHCRitselfcan- 
not ensure that refugee camps are kept 
free of KLA interference, presence or 
control.. ."55 The report noted that the 
presence of NATO forces in and 
around the camps in Northern Alba- 
nia, where some guerrillas were 
present, provided a sense of relative 
security to the refugees. The ambiguity 
of UNHCR's position is evident in the 
following section 498 of the Report: 
... UNHCR is willing to consider col- 
laboration with military units in or- 
der to provide refugees with 
security.. .it is important to stress that 
the UNHCR Statute explicitly pro- 
vides that the agency's role is sup- 
posed to be Humanitarian and 
non-p~litical.~~ 
Recent Debate and Option 
Generation 
Much attention has been focussed on 
the relationship between security is- 
sues and refugee concerns, particularly 
since the Great Lakes crisis after 
1994. The ensuing debate has gener- 
ated important options for coping with 
the challenges of refugee security is- 
s u e ~ . ~ ~  Options involving local secu- 
rity forces, with the recognition that 
local governments often lack the capac- 
ity to deal with complex refugee emer- 
gencies, have been suggested along 
with options of "encadrement," or the 
utilization of trained and monitored 
cadres from the refugee community it- 
self. The enhancement of local govern- 
ment security forces through bilateral 
or multilateral assistance might reduce 
dependency on the international com- 
munity. CIVPOL units, typically 
formed of police volunteers can prevent 
violations of human rights by local se- 
curity forces, although they are gener- 
ally not equipped to deal with 
demilitarization programs. Private se- 
curity cadres might be considered, 
along with international constabulary, 
or armed police units, to support hu- 
manitarian operations. 
PresidentialDecisionDirective PDD 
71, "Strengthening Criminal Justice 
Systems in Support of Peace Opera- 
tions," directed thestate Department to 
establish a new program that would 
train civilian police for international 
peacekeeping missions around the 
world. Civilian police would "provide 
a sense of security and perform tasks 
that heavily armed troops are not well 
trained to handle."58 Although the re- 
lationship of this pool of police to hu- 
manitarian operations has yet to be 
spelled out, the Presidential Directive 
indicates a new awareness on the part 
of the U.S. government of the impor- 
tance of these kinds of security arrange- 
ments. 
Conclusion 
As the twenty-first century begins, the 
international community confronts 
ever more numerous crises involving 
refugees. Among the most difficult is- 
sues challenging UNI-ICR are those in- 
volving security. Simply ensuring ac- 
cess to aid supplies can be an 
overwhelming task in failed states, or 
those engulfed inconflict. Ensuring the 
civilian nature of the refugee camps 
themselves has proved a formidable 
challenge, as has the necessity of pro- 
viding minimum security standards 
within the camps in areas where host 
governments do not have the will or 
capacity to do so. Humanitarian relief 
workers increasingly find themselves 
at ground zero in violent conflicts and 
retaining the neutrality required by 
UNHCR's mandate has proven to be a 
delicate undertaking. Nevertheless, it is 
encouraging to witness the debate that 
has taken place since 1994, which, 
thoughnot without finger pointingand 
scapegoating, has produced aconstruc- 
tive list of options for consideration. 
However, the most complete list of op- 
tions can only be useful if it is backed 
by the political will of the interna- 
tional community to respond quickly 
and firmly to future crises. The chal- 
lenge is whether the lessons of the past 
will provide wisdom for the future. 
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